Smith Investment Company, Sandy Hills, Inc. v. Sandy City : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1997
Smith Investment Company, Sandy Hills, Inc. v.
Sandy City : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark W. Sessions; Kristine Edde; Campbell Maack & Sessions; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
Jody K. Burnett; Williams & Hunt; Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Sandy City.
Clark W. Sessions (2914) Kristine Edde (7190) CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS One Utah
Center, Thirteenth Floor 201 South Main Street Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 Telephone: (801)
537-5555 Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants
Jody K. Burnett (0499) WILLIAMS & HUNT 257 East 200 South, Suite 500 Post Office Box 45678
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Smith Investment Company v. Sandy City, No. 970008 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/608
WTAM COURT OF APPEALS 
BRgfiF UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
DOCKET N a _ 2 2 C Q Q X i X ^ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and 
SANDY HILLS, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SANDY CITY, et al. , 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 970008-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL ENTERED 
BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Clark W. Sessions (2914) 
Kristine Edde (7190) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Jody K. Burnett (0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SMITH INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, and 
SANDY HILLS, INC,, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
SANDY CITY, et al., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 970008-CA 
Priority No. 15 
APPEAL FROM THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL ENTERED 
BY THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, JUDGE TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
Clark W. Sessions (2914) 
Kristine Edde (7190) 
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS 
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor 
201 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2215 
Telephone: (801) 537-5555 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
Jody K. Burnett (0499) 
WILLIAMS & HUNT 
257 East 200 South, Suite 500 
Post Office Box 45678 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5678 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
ARGUMENT ' ' . . . ' ' 1 
I. SANDY CITY'S ACTIONS EXTEND WELL BEYOND THE 
PROTECTIONS OF THE POLICE POWER; MOST IMPORTANTLY, 
SANDY CITY HAS FAILED TO SHOW THAT ITS DOWNZONING 
OF THE SMITHS' PROPERTY BEARS ANY RELATION TO THE 
HEALTH, SAFETY OR WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY 1 
II. SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING OF THE SMITHS' REAR ACREAGE 
DEPRIVES THE SMITHS OF ANY ECONOMICALLY REASONABLE 
USE OF THE PROPERTY; CONSEQUENTLY, SUCH ACTION 
CONSTITUTES A COMPENSABLE TAKING 5 
A. THE SMITHS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO SEEK 
REVIEW OF THE ORDINANCE IN ORDER TO RAISE 
A FACIAL CHALLENGE; CONSEQUENTLY, THEIR 
CLAIMS ARE RIPE FOR REVIEW 5 
B. SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING HAS DEPRIVED THE 
SMITHS OF ALL ECONOMICALLY REASONABLE 
USES OF THEIR PROPERTY; CONSEQUENTLY, IT 
CONSTITUTES A COMPENSABLE TAKING 8 
III. SANDY CITY ACTED OUTSIDE OF THE POLICE POWER IN 
BARRICADING 1055/1075 EAST STREET AND SUBSTANTIALLY 
IMPAIRED THE SMITHS' RIGHT TO ACCESS THEIR 
PROPERTY 11 
CONCLUSION 12 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Bowles v. U.S. . 31 Fed.CI. 37 (1994) 10 
Call v. City of West Jordan, 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 
(Utah 1980) 1 
Hoehne v. County of San Benito. 870 F.2d 529 (9th Cir. 1989) . 7 
Kempf v. City of Iowa Cityr 402 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1987) . . . 10 
Levald. Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680, 686 
(9th Cir. 1993) 6, 7 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 
(Fed.Cir. 1994) 9, 10 
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 
2886 (1992) 9, 11 
State v. Hutchinson. 624 P. 2d 1116 (Utah 1980) 4, 12 
Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton 
Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) 7 
STATUTES 
U.S. Constit. Art. I, § 22 10 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89 12 
iii 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
SANDY CITY'S ACTIONS EXTEND WELL BEYOND THE 
PROTECTIONS OF THE POLICE POWER: MOST 
IMPORTANTLY. SANDY CITY HAS FAILED TO SHOW 
THAT ITS DOWNZONING OF THE SMITHS' PROPERTY 
BEARS ANY RELATION TO THE HEALTH. SAFETY OR 
WELFARE OF THE COMMUNITY, 
In support of its actions, Sandy City attempts to invoke the 
police power afforded municipalities as some sort of blanket 
protection allowing it to take virtually any course of action, 
regardless of the effect upon landowners or constitutional 
guarantees. Although there is a presumption of validity in 
connection with the zoning activities of municipalities, that 
presumption is not, as Sandy City appears to assert, absolute. 
Here, Sandy City merely makes conclusory assertions regarding the 
"public benefit" conferred by its actions, but fails to address the 
facts; namely, that the means chosen do not ensure the attainment 
of its asserted goals. Consequently, Sandy City has failed to meet 
the minimal requirements for successful assertion of the police 
power. 
Tellingly, in Call v. Citv of West Jordan. 614 P.2d 1257, 1258 
(Utah 1980), which is cited by Sandy City, the court noted: "[n]o 
contention is made that the county did not act within its grant of 
1 
powers from the legislature in its adoption of the original zoning 
ordinance." Here, that is exactly the contention made by the 
Smiths; Sandy City acted well beyond its grant of powers by 
enacting a change in zoning which was not in any way calculated to 
address the goals asserted by Sandy City in support of such change. 
In its Brief, Sandy City utterly fails to address the facts 
relied upon by the Smiths. Specifically, the downzoning of the 
rear acreage of the Smiths' property from commercial to R-2-10 
residential fails to meet the City's alleged goal of "preserving 
the residential nature of the area" for the following reasons: 
• Sandy City has asserted primarily that the residential 
nature of the area may be preserved by limiting "proposed uses of 
lot depths exceeding 2 00 feet" (See Brief, p. 4) . Not only does 
the depth suggestion ignore the existence of other commercial 
developments along 700 East with depths that greatly exceed 200 
feet, it also ignores the fact that the Sandy City Comprehensive 
Plan Goals & Policies expressly recommended a policy which would 
preclude the development of typical strip commercial. The 200 feet 
depth suggestion limits commercial development of the Smiths' 
property to exactly that sort of strip development, and 
demonstrates Sandy City's ignorance of its own stated goals. 
2 
• The City's second concern involves access to any future 
commercial development on the rear acreage. Such access from 700 
East is clearly obtainable by simply making alterations in the 
existing commercial development fronting 700 East. Sandy City has 
failed to contradict the undisputed testimony of the Smiths' 
expert, who opined that access to residentialr as opposed to 
commercial development on the rear acreage through the existing 
development fronting 700 East is impractical and unworkable. The 
City has never proposed any access plan for residential development 
on the rear acreage. 
• Finally, as set forth in the Sandy Community Citizens* 
Report and the Sandy City Comprehensive Plan Goals & Policies 
(noted at page 3 of Sandy City's Brief) Sandy City has claimed that 
the "stub streets," which extend into the Smiths' rear acreage, 
create traffic circulation problems, which are allegedly alleviated 
by the change in zoning. However, commercial zoning, as opposed to 
residential, would solve any problem of commercial traffic through 
the surrounding subdivisions, since full and complete ingress and 
egress would be obtained onto and from 700 East. Sandy City has 
not even attempted to show how residential zoning would alleviate 
the alleged problem. 
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In sum, Sandy City has failed to do anything more than merely 
assert general goals of "preservation of residential uses" in 
support of its decision. It has failed to even address the 
specific problems identified by the Smiths. In light of this 
failure, Sandy City's reliance upon the allegedly far-reaching 
police power afforded municipalities is unavailing. The Smiths do 
not, as Sandy City asserts, claim that strict construction of 
municipal actions is the rule. However, it is absolutely 
undisputed that a municipality's actions will not be upheld absent 
some reasonable relation to health, safety, and welfare of the 
public. In fact, in the very case cited by Sandy City, State v. 
Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980), the court noted that county 
ordinances must "rationally promote the public health, safety, 
morals and welfare . . . ." Id. at 1127. 
Sandy City has failed to make such a showing. It has done 
nothing more than make conclusory statements of its purposes, and 
has failed to (1) address the Smiths' concerns regarding the 
problems created by the zoning; and (2) demonstrate how the 
downzoning implements the City's stated goal. Consequently, Sandy 
City has failed to make the minimum showing necessary to sustain 
its actions under fundamental due process standards. 
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II. 
SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING OF THE SMITHS' REAR 
ACREAGE DEPRIVES THE SMITHS OF M X 
ECONOMICALLY REASONABLE USE OF THE PROPERTY: 
CONSEQUENTLY, SUCH ACTION CONSTITUTES A 
COMPENSABLE TAKING. 
In its Brief, Sandy City attempts to characterize this area of 
the law as one that is stable and well-established. In fact, 
constitutional takings analyses, both on a state and federal level, 
are in a significant state of flux. This case presents the ideal 
vehicle for demonstration of the difficulties posed by the case law 
cited by Sandy City. Most importantly, Sandy City's position 
allows it, with the benefit only of vague pronouncements regarding 
preservation of residential uses, to deprive a private landowner of 
reasonable, viable use of its land, and impose a diminution in 
value which is nothing short of devastating. Such a result should 
not be countenanced and must be rejected. 
A. THE SMITHS WERE NOT REQUIRED TO SEEK REVIEW OF THE 
ORDINANCE IN ORDER TO RAISE A FACIAL CHALLENGE; 
CONSEQUENTLY, THEIR CLAIMS ARE RIPE FOR REVIEW. 
Sandy City now attempts to resurrect its "ripeness" argument 
which was impliedly rejected by the trial court. At any rate, 
Sandy City's ripeness argument is utterly lacking in merit; where 
a facial constitutional issue is raised, as the Smiths have done, 
final review is not required. 
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Sandy City argues that the Smiths' takings claim is not "ripe" 
because they did not apply for development approval, despite the 
fact that the property had been zoned R-2-10, and commercial 
development, which is not permitted in such a zone, was and is the 
only feasible development option. Sandy City raised this argument 
in its summary judgment briefing before the trial court. Although 
the trial court's Memorandum Decision did not explicitly discuss 
that argument, the ripeness defense was impliedly rejected, as 
evidenced by the fact that the trial court reached the merits of 
the Smiths' takings claim. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that Sandy City's ripeness argument 
has not already been rejected, it is unavailing. The Smiths have 
raised a facial challenge to the zoning ordinance, for which final 
review, including a request for development approval, is not 
required. 
The Smiths have maintained throughout the course of this 
litigation that the ordinance is facially unconstitutional because 
it results in an uncompensated taking of their property and because 
it does not correct a public evil, while creating an undue burden 
for the Smiths. Because of this facial challenge, the Smiths are 
not required to seek a final decision regarding the applicability 
of the zoning ordinance. Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm Desert, 998 
6 
F.2d 680, 686 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that "final decision" hurdle 
of Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of 
Johnson City1. 473 U.S. 172 (1985) does not apply to facial 
challenges)• 
Furthermore, the futility of seeking development approval is 
apparent. Requiring the owner of property that has been downzoned 
to seek rezoning as a form of administrative remedy for the 
downzoning is nonsensical. The Smiths believe that Sandy City was 
serious when it downzoned the property and would not rezone it to 
commercial simply because the Smiths request that they do so. 
Nothing in the relationship between the Smiths and Sandy City 
suggests otherwise. Substantial authority has held that a property 
owner need not exhaust remedies by seeking permits, etc., if such 
actions would be futile. Hoehne v. County of San Benitof 870 F.2d 
529 (9th Cir. 1989) (where the defendants argued that the 
plaintifffs claim was not ripe because they could have sought a 
variance, a conditional use plan, or applied for a favorable 
rezoning, the court held that such action would have been futile 
where a "final decision" regarding acceptable uses of the property 
appeared to have been reached) ; Levald, Inc. v. City of Palm 
Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that Williamson does 
1
 Cited by Sandy City at page 18 of their Brief. 
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not require plaintiff to seek remedies in state court where it 
would be futile to do so). 
B. SANDY CITY'S DOWNZONING HAS DEPRIVED THE SMITHS OF ALL 
ECONOMICALLY REASONABLE USES OF THEIR PROPERTY; 
CONSEQUENTLY, IT CONSTITUTES A COMPENSABLE TAKING. 
At the heart of Sandy City's argument is a hard-and-fast 
construction of the deprivation of all economically viable use 
rule. However, Sandy City portrays the case law in this area as 
being much more settled and well-established than reality would 
suggest. To accept Sandy City's construction of the case law, one 
must accept the proposition that the City has absolutely no 
constitutional duty to compensate the Smiths, despite the 
following: 
• Sandy City's downzoning reduced the value of the rear 
acreage by over $500,000.00, due to the fact that the highest and 
best use of the Smiths1 property is commercial. 
• Residential development, the option remaining to the 
Smiths, is not economically warranted; the rear acreage is 
surrounded by existing subdivisions which range in age from 30 to 
35 years which contain older, deteriorating low-end housing. The 
construction of new homes in the midst of the existing development 
makes no viable economic sense. 
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• A rental community on the rear acreage would likely cause 
significant ingress and egress problems and would result in 
substantial traffic through the existing subdivision streets with 
all of the attendant safety problems. 
These problems demonstrate the difficulty with the application 
of the deprivation of all economically viable use rule as it is 
advocated by Sandy City. The Smiths have effectively been deprived 
of the economically viable use of their property. The mere fact 
that some possibility for unprofitable, non-viable residential 
development remains should not allow Sandy City to effect a 
virtually complete deprivation without compensation. 
The problem posed in this case is exactly the problem which 
federal and state courts have been struggling with in a number of 
recent decisions. Contrary to the assertions of Sandy City, the 
United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled upon the issue of 
whether a partial or complete loss of economic use is sufficient to 
constitute a taking. The Court discussed both approaches in Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992). See 
Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171, 1180 (Fed.Cir. 
1994) . 
The fact that the law is currently in a state of flux over the 
extent of deprivation necessary to effect a compensable taking is 
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demonstrated by several recent federal court decisions in which it 
was held that a taking occurred even if some economic use 
remained2. See Loveladies Harbor. Inc. v. U.S., 28 F.3d 1171 
(Fed.Cir. 1994)(denial of a fill permit which was necessary to 
complete an ongoing real estate development constituted a taking 
where the fair market value of the parcel prior to permit denial 
was $2,658,000, and $12,500 after denial); Bowles v. U.S.. 31 
Fed.CI. 37 (1994) (denial of fill permit which rendered 
construction of single-family residences, the only economically 
viable use of the property, impossible was a taking) ; Kempf v. City 
of Iowa Cityf 402 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1987) (where zoning change 
decreased value of property from $200,000 to $52,000.00, 
compensable taking occurred). 
Sandy City's attempt to distinguish these cases on the basis 
that the Smiths' land is presently undeveloped is unavailing. In 
fact, the Smiths have instituted and maintained commercial 
development on the front portion of the property which abuts 700 
East. The long-term goal of the Smiths has always been to initiate 
2
 A more reasonable, less restrictive view of the economic 
use rule is particularly apt in light of Article I, Section 22 of 
the Utah Constitution, which allows compensation for private 
property which is not only taken, but damaged for public use. It 
is difficult to imagine a clearer-cut case of damage than the 
present set of facts. 
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commercial development on the rear acreage as well, a fact which is 
undisputed by Sandy City, Consideration of these long-term, 
investment-backed expectations, which Sandy City has utterly 
ignored, is not only a factor, it is mandated by the Lucas decison. 
III. 
SANDY CITY ACTED OUTSIDE OF THE POLICE POWER 
IN BARRICADING 1055/1075 EAST STREET AND 
SUBSTANTIAL? IMPAIRED TgE SMITHS' RIGHT TO 
ACCESS THEIR PROPERTY. 
Sandy City attempts to legitimize its conduct by setting forth 
unsubstantiated, vague objectives. The real problem with Sandy 
City's argument is that it utterly fails to recognize the fact that 
the Smiths' right to access their property has been substantially 
impaired by the barricade erected by Sandy City and, as such, the 
Smiths are entitled to compensation. 
Sandy City placed a barricade at the border of the Smiths' 
property as it abuts 1055/1075 East Street. The street runs 
through an adjoining subdivision. In support of its action, Sandy 
City relies upon vague pronouncements concerning dust and police 
enforcement of driving violations on the Smiths' property. In 
fact, Sandy City has failed to overcome two crucial facts: (1) the 
Smiths' right to access this significant-size parcel has been 
substantially damaged and; (2) the roadway in question was 
dedicated to public use. In light of these two concerns, Sandy 
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City's reliance upon the police power is unavailing. Contrary to 
the position asserted by Sandy City, the arbitrary or 
unconstitutional actions of governmental entities are indeed 
reviewable. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1126 (Utah 1980) 
(courts will review local decisions which are "arbitrary, or [are] 
directly prohibited by . . .the state or federal laws or the 
constitution of this state or of the United States"). 
Here, Sandy City's barricade is not only unsupported by 
sufficient rationale, it is directly contrary to statute; 
specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-89. Sandy City attempts to 
avoid application of the statute by claiming that the Smiths never 
received an adjudication by clear and convincing evidence that the 
road had in fact been dedicated to the public. In fact, this 
requirement is imposed to protect the rights of private landowners. 
Where, as here, the landowner is asserting the application of the 
statute such an adjudication is not required or necessary. 
Furthermore, even if an adjudication were necessary, the trial 
court was requested to make it. 
CONCLUSION 
Sandy City has continually failed to address the concerns 
raised Dy the Smiths, which demonstrate that residential zoning in 
this area does not meet due process requirements; specifically, it 
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does not rationally promote the public health, safety, morals and 
welfare. This is particularly true since Sandy City has failed to 
demonstrate how residential zoning implements its stated goals, in 
light of the concerns raised by the Smiths; namely, access concerns 
and Sandy City's own stated goal of reducing strip commercial 
development. 
However, it is Sandy City's conduct with respect to the 
takings claim that presents the real difficulty. Sandy City 
attempts to argue that a reduction in value of approximately 
$500,000.00, caused by a single swipe of the pen by Sandy City, is 
inconsequential. The City's downzoning has left the Smith's with 
one development option; residential. Residential development is 
plainly unsuitable and nothing short of economically disastrous in 
this area. It is exactly because of this type of problem that 
takings analyses has been undergoing significant evolution. 
Allowing Sandy City to effect unconstitutional down zoning with no 
accompanying requirement of compensation is exactly the municipal 
conduct addressed by federal and state takings provisions, and 
should not be countenanced. 
Finally, Sandy City's barricade of 1055/1075 East Street is 
unsupported by any valid exercise of the policy power, particularly 
in light of the vague assertions of purpose enunciated by Sandy 
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City and the fact that the street was dedicated to public use. 
Consequently, the trial court's entry of summary judgment on these 
issues should be reversed, the case remanded and the Smiths awarded 
their costs. 
DATED: October 10, 1997. 
C_O£ARK W. SE 
KRISTINE EDDE 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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